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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order granting the motions to
dismiss by Defendants Beatrice Coleman and Ernest McGhee.

The district

court's order was based on an interpretation of I.C. § 49-808(2) that fails to give
the statutory language its plain, ordinary, and rational meaning. Accordingly, the
district court erred in concluding the state's evidence should be excluded and
Coleman's and McGhee's cases dismissed. Applying a correct interpretation of
the statute to the facts here, this Court should reverse and remand.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Coleman and McGhee were traveling east in the left lane of Interstate 84,
passing a semi-truck that was traveling in the right lane. (R., p. 67.) Idaho State
Police Trooper Janeece Gonzales, also in the left lane, approached Coleman
and McGee's car from behind. (R., p. 67.) Gonzales saw the driver of Coleman
and McGee's car "engage[ ) the turn signal and gradually merge back into the
right lane" after passing the semi-truck. (R., p. 67.) Gonzales testified the driver
signaled for only three seconds before changing lanes - less than Gonzales
believed was required under I.C. § 49-808(2). (R., pp. 67-68.) Based on this,
Gonzales initiated a traffic stop. (R., pp. 67-68.)
Coleman and McGhee identified themselves and produced the car's title,
but could not find insurance documentation. (R., p. 68.) Coleman and McGhee
told Gonzales they knew the previous owner, but were unable to give the owner's
name; Coleman and McGhee also would not make eye contact with Gonzales.
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(R., p. 68.) Based on their behavior, Gonzles asked them if they had any illegal
items in the car.

(R., p. 68.)

McGhee told Gonzales "that Coleman had

approximately one and a half pounds of medical marijuana present in the
vehicle."

(R., p. 68.)

"Coleman then presented Gonzales with her medical

marijuana card from the State of Oregon and McGhee presented Gonzales with
a marijuana growers card from the State of Oregon." (R., p. 68.)
McGhee told Gonzales the marijuana was in a duffel bag in the trunk of
the car. (R., p. 69.) On a search of the vehicle, Gonzales "found four separate
zipper sealed plastic bags containing marijuana" in a duffel bag in the car's trunk.
then

Coleman and McGhee under arrest. (R., p. 69.)

The state charged

Coleman and

McGhee with drug-trafficking in

marijuana under I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1 )(A). (R., pp. 44-45.) The defendants filed
motions to dismiss in their respective cases, asserting the traffic stop leading to
their arrests was not supported by reasonable suspicion. (R., pp. 54, 69.) After
hearing oral argument on the motions, the district court granted the motions,
dismissing Coleman's and McGhee's cases.

(R., pp. 69-73, 77. 1 ) The district

court based its decision on its reading of the statute as requiring a driver to
deploy the turn signal for five continuous seconds only if turning onto a
controlled-access highway from a parked position.

(R., pp. 70-72.) The state

timely appealed. (R., pp. 79-81.)

The district court articulated no legal basis for dismissing the case, as opposed
to suppressing evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Nevertheless,
the state acknowledges that it would be compelled to dismiss the case for lack of
evidence if the evidence in question is ultimately suppressed.
1

2

ISSUE
Did the district court erred in granting Coleman's and McGhee's motions to
dismiss because Trooper Gonzales properly stopped defendants' vehicle for
violation of I.C. § 49-808(2), or because Trooper Gonzales reasonably believed
that defendants violated that provision, thus warranting the stop?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Granting Coleman's And McGhee's Motions To
Dismiss Because Trooper Gonzales Properly Stopped Defendants' Vehicle For
Violation Of I.C. § 49-808(2), Or Reasonably Believed That Defendants Violated
That Provision, Thus Warranting The Stop

A.

Introduction
In its order granting Coleman's and McGhee's motions to dismiss, the

district court found that I.C. § 49-808(2) is plain and unambiguous. (R., p. 70.)
But according to the district court, that provision plainly and unambiguously
requires a driver to signal for five seconds only before "turning from a parked
position" onto a "controlled-access highway." 2 (R., p. 70.) The district court thus
concluded that Trooper Gonzales' stop of Coleman and McGhee's vehicle was
invalid.

(R., p. 70.)

meaning,

However, giving the statute its plain, obvious and rational

the district court's

interpretation

of the provision

is in

error.

Accordingly, this Court should reverse the orders of dismissal and remand for
further proceedings.

B.

Standard Of Review
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law freely reviewed on appeal.

State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, _, 314 P.3d 136, 139 (2013).

A "controlled-access highway" is defined in the motor vehicle code as: "Any
highway or roadway in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands
and other persons have no legal right of access to or from the highway except at
such points only or in such manner as may be determined by the public authority
having jurisdiction over the highway." I.C. § 49-109(5)(b). It is undisputed that
Interstate 84 is a controlled-access highway. (See R., p. 71.)
2
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C.

Trooper Gonzales Properly Stopped Coleman And McGhee's Vehicle For
Violation Of I.C. § 49-808(2), Which Plainly And Unambiguously Requires
A Driver To Deploy A Turn Signal For Five Seconds Before Moving Right
Or Left On a Controlled-Access Highway
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants

and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable.

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop,

146 Idaho 804,811,203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by
an officer's reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203
P.3d at 1210.
"An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal
behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being
driven contrary to traffic laws." Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785 (citing
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981 )). "Reasonable suspicion requires
less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the part of the
officer." State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2010)
(citation omitted).

Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is

evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or
before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 1210; State v.
Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
5

Trooper Gonzales stopped Coleman and McGhee after observing their car
change lanes on Interstate 84 without first deploying a turn signal for at least five
continuous seconds. (R., pp. 67-68.) The district court found "it is undisputed
that Interstate 84 is a controlled access highway" (R., p. 71 ), and that defendants'
car signaled "for at least three seconds" before the car began to cross the center
line (R., p. 68 n.1 ).
Idaho Code § 49-808 governs the use of turn signals on Idaho highways
and provides, in relevant part:
(1) No person shall turn a vehicle onto a highway or move a
vehicle right or left upon a highway or merge onto or exit from a
highway unless and until the movement can be made with
reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal.
(2) A signal of intention to turn or move right or left when required
shall be given continuously to warn other traffic. On controlledaccess highways and before turning from a parked position, the
signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds
and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred
(100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.
I.C. § 49-808(1 ), (2). The district court interpreted subsection (2) of this statute
as requiring "that a vehicle must engage its turn single [sic] for five seconds only
when that vehicle is both (1) on a controlled-access highway, and (2) turning
from a parked position." (R., p. 70.) Applying this interpretation to its factual
findings, the district court thus concluded Trooper Gonzales' stop was not
justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Coleman and McGhee's
vehicle violated I.C. § 49-808(2).

(R., p. 72.).

Under principles of statutory

interpretation, the district court's analysis was incorrect.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v.
6

Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the
best guide to legislative intent is the wording of the statute itself, the
interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.

Verska v. Saint

Alphonsus Reg'I Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011 ); State
v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words of a statute
'"must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not
construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265
P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721
(2003)).

"[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and

other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the
clearly expressed intent of the legislature."

&

(quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun

Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)).
The language of I.C. § 49-808(2) at issue in this case provides:

"On

controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked position, the signal
shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds and, in all other
instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the
vehicle before turning."

The district court determined that "and" between the

prepositional phrases "[o]n controlled-access highways" and "before turning from
a parked position" is conjunctive and indicates the legislature's intent that the
five-second signal requirement apply only to drivers who are both on a
controlled-access highway and turning from a parked position. (R., pp. 70-72.)
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The word "and" is usually conjunctive and joins together words or phrases
for the purpose of "'expressing the idea that the latter"' of the words or phrases
so connected are '"to be added to or taken along with the first."' Ameritel Inns,
Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbock Auditorium or Community Center Dist., 146 Idaho
202, 205, 192 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2008) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6 th ed.
1990)); see also Brink v. State, 117 Idaho 55, 57, 785 P.2d 619, 621 (1990).
However, depending on the context in which it is used, the conjunction "and" can
also simply denote that there is more than one of something. See,~. State v.
Yzaguirre,

144 Idaho 471,

475-77,

163 P.3d

1183,

1187-1189 (2007)

(interpreting word "and" in statutory phrase "[t]o consider and advise its legal
representatives in pending litigation" as signifying two purposes - "considering,
and advising legal representatives in, pending litigation" - for which executive
session is authorized); K Mart Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 111 Idaho 719,
721,727 P.2d 1147, 1149 (1986) (interpreting word "and" in statute providing for
certain tax exemptions as indicating there are "two types" of property subject to
the exemption). Ultimately, the meaning of the word "and," like the meaning of
every other word in a statute, must be interpreted in light of the words that
surround it. See,~' Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho at 476, 163 P.3d at 1188 (first step
in determining meaning of disputed word or words "is to examine the literal words
of the statute to determine whether they support the parties' differing
interpretations").
Contrary to the district court's reading of I.C. § 49-808(2), interpreting that
provision's use of the word "and" in its ordinarily understood conjunctive sense,
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and in the context of the entire statute, supports that the five-second signal
requirement applies in both of two situations - when a driver is moving right or
left on a controlled-access highway and when he or she is turning from a parked
position - not that both circumstances need be present before the five-second
signal is required. Construed as a whole, the plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2)
clearly sets forth two sets of circumstances in which a driver is required to signal
continuously for not less than five (5) seconds.

The first is "[o]n controlled-

access highways,"· and the second is "before turning from a parked position."
That the word "and" separates these two sets of circumstances is not an
indication of legislative intent that both sets of circumstances must exist to trigger
the five-second signal requirement. The legislature used the word "and" twice in
§ 49-808(2) - once to indicate the two circumstances in which a five-second

signal is required and again, in the same sentence, to indicate a third
circumstance, i.e. "all other instances," in which a signal is required "for not less
than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning."
Given the context in which the word "and" appears throughout the statute, it is
clear that the legislature intended its placement between the phrases "[o)n
controlled-access highways" and "before turning from a parked position" simply
to indicate there is more than one circumstance, or "instance," in which the fivesecond signal requirement applies.
That the legislature intended to enumerate two separate circumstances in
which a five-second signal is required is also supported by a strict grammatical
reading of the statute. The statute in this case does not utilize the word "and"
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merely to join together items in a conjunctive list. See Ameritel Inns, 146 Idaho
at 204-05, 192 P .3d at 1028-29 (interpreting statute defining auditorium district as
"one to build, operate, maintain, market and manage" public facilities as meaning
an auditorium district must perform all of the listed functions).

Nor does it join

together two unmodified verbs. See Brink, 117 Idaho at 56-57, 785 P.2d at 62021 (word "and" in statutory phrase "probable cause to stop and request" is
"plainly conjunctive," requiring officer to "have probable cause to stop the driver

and probable cause to request that the driver submit to" evidentiary test); State v.
Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 830, 230 P.3d 437, 440 (Ct. App. 2010) (interpreting
statute authorizing court to "[s]uspend the execution of the judgment ... and
place the defendant on probation" as "suggest[ing] that the suspension of a
sentence must always be accompanied by probation"). Rather, the word "and" in
I.C. § 49-808(2) joins together two independent prepositional phrases - "[o]n

controlled-access highways" and "before turning from a parked position" - each
of which individually modifies the remainder of the sentence to indicate when a
five-second signal is required.

See http://grammar.yourdictionary.com/parts-of-

speech/prepositions/Prepositional-Phrases.html# ("[T]he preposition functions to
illustrate a logical, temporal, or spatial relationship between the object of the
prepositional phrase and the other components of the sentence.").
If, as the district court hypothesized (R., p. 71 ), the legislature intended
that both circumstances must exist before the five-second signal requirement
applies, it could have easily indicated as much by making the prepositional
phrases dependent upon each other, as follows: "Before turning from a parked
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position on controlled access-highways" - thus eliminating the need for the word
"and" between the prepositional phrases at all. That the legislature chose not to
do so and, instead, used independent prepositional phrases to describe the
circumstances in which a five-second signal is required is evidence of the
legislature's intent that either circumstance is sufficient by itself to trigger the fivesecond signal requirement.
The district court's assessment that the word "and" always means "added
to" or "taken along with the first" (R., p. 70), as opposed to two of something,
defies both common sense and the law. See, ~ . K Mart Corp., 111 Idaho at
721, 727 P.2d at 1149 (word "and" interpreted as separating "two types" of
property subject to statutory exemption).

Also, like courts in numerous other

jurisdictions, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he word 'and' in a
statute may be read 'or,' and vice versa, whenever the change is necessary to
give the statute sense and effect, or harmonize its different parts, or carry out the
evident intention of the Legislature." State v. Enking, 59 Idaho 321, 82 P.2d 649,
661 (1938); accord In re C.H., 264 P.3d 357, 362 (Cal. 2011 ); County of Du Page
v. Illinois Labor Relations Bd., 900 N.E.2d 1095, 1103 (111. 2008); Harrell v.
Bowen, 655 S.E.2d 350, 352 (N.C. 2008); Bullseye Distributing LLC v. State, 110
P.3d 1162, 1165 (Wash. App. 2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes§ 147 (updated Feb.
2014); see also Sale v. Johnson, 129 S.E.2d 465, 469-70 (N.C. 1963) ('"The
popular use of 'or' and 'and' is so loose and so frequently inaccurate, that it has
infected statutory enactments.

For this reason, their strict meaning is more

readily departed from than that of other words."' (Citation omitted)).
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Interpreting the word "and" in I.C. § 49-808(2) as signifying two distinct
circumstances in which a five-second signal is required is demanded, not only by
the context in which that word is used, but because a contrary interpretation
would render portions of the statute superfluous. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory interpretation that a statute must be interpreted so that effect is given to
its every word and clause. State v. Trusdall, _Idaho_, 318 P.3d 955, 960
(Ct. App. 2014); State v. Wright, 154 Idaho 157, 159, 295 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct.
App. 2013). The first sentence of I.C. § 49-808(2) states: "A signal of intention
to tum or move right or left when required shall be given continuously to warn
other traffic." (Emphasis added). The second sentence, at issue in this case,
then provides: "On controlled-access highways and before turning from a parked
position, the signal shall be given continuously for not less than five (5) seconds
and, in all other instances, for not less than the last one hundred (100) feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning." I.C. § 49-808(2) (emphasis added).
Based on a plain reading of this language, there can be little doubt that
"the signal" referred to in the second sentence of the statute is the same "signal"
already described in the first sentence - i.e., "[a] signal of intention to turn or
move right or left." If, as articulated by the district court, the five-second signal
requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2) only applies to drivers who are both "on
controlled-access highways" and "turning from a parked position," the "or move
right or left" language contained in the first sentence of the statute would be of no
effect.

Indeed, under the district court's interpretation, a person driving on a

controlled-access highway would never have to signal an intention to move right

12

or left for any particular time or distance. Clearly, this could not have been the
legislature's intent. 3
In interpreting I.C. § 49-808(2), this Court must give effect to the entire
statute and assume that the legislature had a purpose in using the language it
did. Trusdall, _

Idaho at_ 318 P.3d at 959-60; State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho

801, 803, 891 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ct. App. 1995). For all of the reasons already
discussed herein, interpreting l.C. § 49-808(2) as a whole leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the five-second signal requirement plainly applies in
two distinct circumstances: when a driver is turning or moving right or left on a
controlled-access highway and when he or she is turning from a parked position.
The plain language of I.C. § 49-808(2) unambiguously evidences the
legislature's intent that the five-second signal requirement applies to drivers on
controlled-access highways regardless of whether they are also turning from a
parked position and, likewise, to drivers turning from a parked position regardless
of whether they are on a controlled-access highway.

Accordingly, this Court

need not engage in statutory construction. But even assuming an ambiguity in
the statute, the same result obtains from statutory construction.
To ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous statute, "not only must the
literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the
public policy behind the statute and its legislative history." Trusdall, _

Idaho at

_ , 318 P.3d at 958 (citing State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646, 22 P.3d 116,

3

The alternative reading is that the statute requires a signal "for not less than the
last one hundred (100) feet traveled" when "turning from a parked position" on a
road other than a controlled-access highway, an obvious impossibility.
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121 (Ct. App. 2001)). When construing an ambiguous statute, this Court must
give it "an interpretation which will not render it a nullity."

kl

"Constructions of

an ambiguous statute that would lead to an absurd result are disfavored."

kl

The obvious purpose of I.C. § 49-808(2) is to promote the safety of
motorists travelling on Idaho's highways.

The signal requirements set forth

therein facilitate that purpose because "signaling puts other potentially affected
drivers on notice of the signaling driver's intention."

Burton v. State of Idaho

Dep't of Transp., 149 Idaho 746, 240 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010) (Gratton, J.,
specially concurring) (citing State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 666-67, 991 P.2d
388, 391-92 (Ct. App. 1999)). Considering this purpose, and keeping in mind the
context in which the literal words of I.C. § 49-808(2) appear, it only makes sense
that the legislature intended the five-second signal requirement to apply in
circumstances where motorists are most vulnerable, either because they are
driving at high rates of speed (on controlled-access highways) or because they
are sitting stationary (turning from a parked position) on a road upon which other
motorists are traveling. In both circumstances, the requirement of a five-second
signal furthers the purpose of the statute by giving other potentially affected
motorists (1) sufficient notice that the signaling motorist intends to turn or move
left or right on the roadway, and (2) sufficient time to prepare for and react
appropriately to the impending turn or lane change, if such reaction is required.
Interpreting the five-second signal requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2) as read
by the district court - such that the requirement applies only to drivers who are
turning from a parked position on controlled-access highways - is entirely
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inconsistent with the purpose of the statute and leads to absurd results.

It is

unlikely the legislature, in enacting the five-second signal requirement, intended
that motorists driving on controlled-access highways be allowed to change lanes
after signaling for just 100 feet before making a lane change. A motorist driving
the speed limit of 75 miles per hour would only have to activate his or her signal
for less than one second before crossing from one lane of traffic to another. 4 It
would also mean that motorists driving at lower rates of speed on city streets
would have to provide a significantly longer signal of intention to change lanes
than would motorists traveling at speeds of up to 75 m.p.h. on the freeway. Such
perverse results are not consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute and
surely could not have been intended by the legislature.
The text, structure, and purpose of I.C. § 49-808(2) clearly demonstrate
the legislature's intent that the five-second signal requirement applies both to
motorists who are driving on controlled-access highways and to motorists who
are turning from a parked position. As there is no ambiguity, the Court need not
apply the rule of lenity to favor Coleman and McGhee. Trusdall, _

Idaho at

_ , 318 P.3d at 959 (the rule of lenity applies to resolve an "interpretive tie" in
favor of the defendant only if, "after examining the text, context, history, and
policy of the statute," the ambiguity remains); see also State v. Beard, 135 Idaho
641,646, 22 P.3d 116,121 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459,462,
988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999).

This Court can take judicial notice that, at 75 m.p.h., a motorist would travel 100
feet in just over one second (5280 feet in a mile, 3600 seconds in an hour; 75
mph= 396000 feet per 3600 seconds, or 110 feet per second). See I.R.E. 201.
4
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For these reasons, the district court misinterpreted I.C. § 49-808(2), and
erred in granting Coleman's and McGhee's motions to dismiss. Accordingly, this
Court should reverse and remand.

D.

Even If This Court Determines Coleman And McGhee Did Not Violate The
Signal Requirements Of I.C. § 49-808(2), This Court Should Conclude The
Trooper's Mistaken Belief That They Did Was Objectively Reasonable And
Did Not Invalidate The Stop
Even if this Court accepts the district court's interpretation of I.C. § 49-

808(2) and finds that Coleman and McGhee were not required to signal for at
least five seconds before changing lanes on Interstate 84, the Court should
nevertheless uphold the traffic stop on the basis that Trooper Gonzales' mistake
regarding the legal requirements of I.C. § 49-808(2) was objectively reasonable.
Whether an officer's mistake of law will necessarily invalidate a traffic stop
is an issue that has never been squarely addressed by Idaho's appellate courts. 5
See State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 246 P.3d 673 (Ct. App. 2010) (declining to
address whether mistake of law invalidated traffic stop because "mistake at issue
was primarily one of fact"); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App.
2008) (where officer's alleged mistake of law did not cause Buell's detention,
authorities addressing the viability of detentions based on mistakes of law were
"inapposite"); State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999)

5

The state recognizes that in Burton v. State of Idaho Dep't of Transp., 149
Idaho 746, 748-50, 240 P.3d 933, 935-37 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court of
Appeals held that, because the statute upon which the officer effectuated the
traffic stop could not be constitutionally applied to Burton, "no legal cause existed
to effectuate" that stop. It does not appear, however, that the Burton Court
considered or decided whether an officer's mistake of law can be held to be
reasonable such that a stop predicated on the mistake does not run afoul of
either the United States or Idaho constitutions.
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(finding it unnecessary to "resolve whether a police officer's mistake of law is
unreasonable per se" because, even "allowing for reasonable mistakes of law by
police," there was "nothing in the record from which it might be concluded that
the officer's mistake was objectively reasonable"). As noted by the Idaho Court
of Appeals in McCarthy, other courts that have considered the issue "are in
conflict in their assessment of whether a mistake of law is unreasonable per se or
is to be tested under the same reasonableness standard that applies to mistakes
of fact." 133 Idaho at 125,982 P.2d at 960, cited in Horton, 150 Idaho at 303,
246 P.3d at 676. A growing number of courts hold that, so long as an officer's
mistake of law is objectively reasonable, it can form the reasonable suspicion
required to justify a traffic stop. See, M,., United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998
(8 th Cir. 2005); State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012); State v. Wright, 791
N.W.2d 791 (S.D. 2010); Moore v. State, 986 So.2d 928, 935 (Miss. 2008); State
v. Rheinlander, 649 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
While courts on both sides of the issue have articulated persuasive
justifications for their holdings, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Heien is particularly compelling.

In that case, an officer stopped

Heien because the vehicle in which he was travelling did not have two properly
functioning brake lights. Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 352. On appeal, the Heien Court
assumed that the relevant statutory provisions required only one properly
functioning brake light. J.g_,_ at 354. Because the traffic stop was predicated solely
on the officer's mistaken belief that the vehicle was being operated in violation of
a statute that, in actuality, did not prohibit the conduct at issue, the question
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squarely before the Heien Court was whether the officer's mistake of law
nonetheless gave rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the
routine traffic stop.

1st

In resolving this question, the Heien Court examined the conflicting views
of the various federal and state courts that have addressed the issue.

1st at 355-

56. The court acknowledged the justification for the majority rule - i.e., that, to
be constitutionally permissible, "a stop must be objectively grounded in the actual
governing law."

1st

at 356 (citing United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d

1271, 1277-78 (11 th Cir. 2003) (and cases cited therein)). The court ultimately
found the justifications for the minority rule "more compelling," however, citing the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning that allowing for objectively reasonable mistakes of law
"is in keeping with the foundational principle that an officer's actions must be
'objectively reasonable in the circumstances."'

1st

(citing Martin, 411 F.3d at

1001 ).
Expounding on the Eighth Circuit's rationale, the Heien Court proffered a
number of convincing reasons why allowing for reasonable mistakes of law does
not offend the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, all of which would apply equally under a state constitutional
analysis. First, such a rule is entirely "consistent with the primary command of
the Fourth Amendment - that law enforcement agents act reasonably."
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).

1st (citing

A rule that prohibits an

officer from making even objectively reasonable mistakes, "mandating that he be
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perfect, would impose a greater burden than that required under the Fourth
Amendment." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 356.
Next, a rule that allows for objectively reasonable mistakes of law by
officers, at least as to the interpretation of traffic laws, is also justified by the
interests at stake during a traffic stop. As explained by the court in Heien:
[B]ecause we are particularly concerned for maintaining safe
roadways, we do not want to discourage our police officers from
conducting stops for perceived traffic violations. A routine traffic
stop, based on what an officer reasonably perceives to be a
violation, is not a substantial interference with the detained
individual and is a minimal invasion of privacy .... And particularly
when judged against society's countervailing interest in keeping its
roads safe, we think it prudent to endorse the reasonable
interpretation of our traffic safety laws.

kL at 357. The fact that a traffic stop need only be supported by reasonable
suspicion and involves only a minimal intrusion on the privacy of the individual
stopped is what differentiates this case from other cases in which the Idaho
Supreme Court has declined to apply a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
rule under the Idaho Constitution. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 272 P.3d
483 (2012); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992).

While

providing citizens greater protections from warrantless searches of their person,
homes, cars and other property may well be justified in light of the inherently
invasive nature of such searches, the same concerns are not present when an
officer, having an objectively reasonable (albeit mistaken) belief that a motorist
has committed a traffic violation, briefly detains the motorist for the purpose of
simply confirming or dispelling that suspicion.
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Holding that an officer's objectively reasonable mistake of law does not

ipso facto render a traffic stop invalid also makes sense because, unlike
attorneys, officers are not trained in the intricacies of the substantive law and, as
such, cannot be expected "to interpret the traffic laws with the subtlety and
expertise of a criminal defense attorney."

Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 356 (quoting

Martin, 411 F.3d at 1001 (internal quotations and citation omitted).) Again, the
Heien Court's reasoning is instructive:
[C]oncerns about the rules of construction regarding the
substantive statutes at issue seem to us to be more applicable to
the subsequent judicial interpretation of a statute and not to a
routine traffic stop that needs to be based only on reasonable
suspicion. A post hoc judicial interpretation of a substantive traffic
law does not determine the reasonableness of a previous traffic
stop within the meaning of the state and federal constitutions. Such
a post hoc determination resolves whether the conduct that
previously occurred is actually within the contours of the
substantive statute.
But that determination does not resolve
whether the totality of the circumstances present at the time the
conduct transpired supports a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the statute was being violated. It is the latter inquiry that is the
focus of a constitutionality determination, not the former.

kl at 357.

Because law enforcement officers are charged with enforcing the law,

not deciding its precise scope, allowing for objectively reasonable mistakes of
law does not offend the Fourth Amendment.
In fact, requiring "law enforcement officers to accurately forecast how a
reviewing court will interpret the substantive law at issue" is actually "inconsistent
with the rationale underlying the reasonable suspicion doctrine."

kl

Both the

United States Supreme Court and Idaho's appellate courts have recognized that
reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to any precise legal formula, but must
instead be based on commonsense judgments considering the totality of all of
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the circumstances known to the officer. ~ ' Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
125 (2000); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996); State v. Kessler,
151 Idaho 653, 655, 262 P.3d 682, 684 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Preventing officers from
reasonably interpreting the laws upon which they base traffic stops "would
transform this 'commonsense, nontechnical conception' into something that
requires much more than 'some minimal level of objective justification"'; instead
of "merely requir[ing] that our officers be reasonable," it "would mandate that they
be omniscient." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 357-58. In addition, treating an officer's
reasonable mistake of law as dispositive of the reasonable suspicion inquiry
would also "insert rigidity into" what is otherwise "a fluid concept" and would
render unrecognizable "the traditional constitutional inquiry" that asks "whether a
traffic stop is reasonable under a// the circumstances."
omitted) (emphasis added).

&

at 358 (citations

Departing from traditional inquiries that guide

whether a traffic stop is constitutionally permissible, based solely on an officer's
inability in the field to accurately predict how a reviewing court will ultimately
interpret the law, seems neither wise nor warranted where the officer's mistake of
law is otherwise objectively reasonable.
As a final justification for adopting a rule that allows for reasonable
mistakes of law in the reasonable suspicion context, the Heien Court accurately
observed that such an "approach allows reviewing courts to treat all police
mistakes the same." Id. Neither the Supreme Court nor Idaho's appellate courts
"demand factual accuracy from our police when determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists."

&

(citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990));
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see also Horton, 150 Idaho at 302-04, 246 P.3d at 675-77; McCarthy, 133 Idaho
at 124-25, 982 P.2d at 959-60.

And, as observed by the Heien Court, there

simply is "no constitutional requirement to distinguish between mistakes of fact
and mistakes of law in this context." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 358. This is especially
true since determining whether a mistake is one of fact or one of law is not
always easy.

kL

accord McCarthy. 133 Idaho at 124-25, 982 P.2d 959-60.

Indeed, in some instances, the two types of mistakes are "inextricably
connected." McCarthy. 133 Idaho at 124, 982 P.2d at 959. Because the line
between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact is not always easily ascertainable,
the better rule, and the one that is consistent with the reasonableness
requirements of both the federal and state constitutions, is that "so long as an
officer's mistake is [objectively] reasonable, it may give rise to reasonable
suspicion." Heien, 737 S.E.2d at 358.
For all of the reasons set forth above, this Court should hold that, so long
as an officer's mistake of law is objectively reasonable, it can form the
reasonable suspicion required to justify a traffic stop.

Assuming this Court

adopts such a rule, application of that rule to the facts of this case easily leads to
the conclusion that the traffic stop was constitutionally permissible.
As already discussed in detail, the plain and unambiguous language of
I.C. § 49-808(2) requires drivers on controlled-access highways to signal
continuously for at least five seconds before making a lane change.

Thus,

Trooper Gonzales was not mistaken at all in her belief that Coleman and
McGhee violated the relevant statutory provision when their car signaled for
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about three seconds before changing lanes on Interstate 84. (R., p. 68.) Even
assuming, however, that this Court concludes the five-second signal requirement
did not apply to defendants' conduct, the trooper's mistaken belief that it did was
clearly objectively reasonable.

At worst, the language of I.C. § 49-808(2) is

ambiguous - i.e., "susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation."
McCarthy, 133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at 960. Because the five-second signal
requirement of I.C. § 49-808(2) can, at the very least be reasonably interpreted to
apply to defendants' conduct, the trooper's mistaken belief that it did was
objectively reasonable and did not invalidate the traffic stop. Compare McCarthy,
133 Idaho at 125, 982 P.2d at 960 (declining to find alleged mistake of law
objectively reasonable where the operative law was not "ambiguous or
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.").

This Court should

therefore reverse and remand.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order dismissing Coleman's and McGhee's cases, and remand for further
proceedings.
DATED this 6th day of May, 2014.

~t?F
Deputy Attorney General
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